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Abstract
While traditional economics assumes that hu-
mans are fully rational agents who always
maximize their expected utility, in practice, we
constantly observe apparently irrational behav-
ior. One explanation is that people have limited
computational power, so that they are, quite ra-
tionally, making the best decisions they can,
given their computational limitations. To test
this hypothesis, we consider the multi-armed
bandit (MAB) problem. We examine a simple
strategy for playing an MAB that can be imple-
mented easily by a probabilistic finite automa-
ton (PFA). Roughly speaking, the PFA sets cer-
tain expectations, and plays an arm as long as it
meets them. If the PFA has sufficiently many
states, it performs near-optimally. Its perfor-
mance degrades gracefully as the number of
states decreases. Moreover, the PFA acts in
a “human-like” way, exhibiting a number of
standard human biases, like an optimism bias
and a negativity bias.
1 INTRODUCTION
Behavioral economists have argued for years that the tra-
ditional model of homo economicus—an agent who is
always rational and behaves optimally—is misguided.
There is a lot of experimental work backing up their
claims (see, e.g., (Thaler 2015)). Recent work has ar-
gued that perhaps the behavior that we observe can best
be explained by thinking of agents as rational (i.e., try-
ing to behave optimally), but not able to due to compu-
tational limitations; that is, they are doing the best they
can, given their computational limitations.
In this paper, following a tradition that goes back Ru-
binstein (1986) and Neyman (1985), we model computa-
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tionally bounded agents as probabilistic finite automata
(PFAs). We can think of the number of states of the au-
tomaton as a proxy for how computationally bounded the
agent is. Neyman (1985) showed that cooperation can
arise if PFAs play a finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma;
work on this topic has continued to attract attention (see
Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (1994) and the references
therein). Wilson (2015) considered a decision problem
where an agent must decide whether nature is in state 0
or state 1, after getting signals that are correlated with
nature’s state. She characterized an optimal n-state PFA
for making this decision, and showed that it exhibited
“human-like” behavior; specifically, it ignored evidence
(something a Bayesian would never do), and exhibited
what could be viewed as a first-impression bias and con-
firmation bias. Halpern, Pass, and Seeman (2012) con-
sidered a similar problem in a dynamic setting, where the
state of nature could change (slowly) over time. Again,
they showed that a simple PFA both performed well
and exhibited the kind of behavior humans exhibited in
games studied by Erev, Ert, and Roth (2010).
We continue this line of work, and try to understand the
behavior of computationally bounded agents playing a
multi-armed bandit (e.g., playing slot machines in Las
Vegas). Our first step in doing this is to understand the
extent to which optimal play can be approximated by a
PFA without worrying about the number of states used.
There are a number of notions of optimal that we could
consider. Here we focus on arguably the simplest one:
we compare the expected average payoff of the automa-
ton after it runs for N steps to the expected average pay-
off of always pulling the optimal arm of the bandit. We
also assume that the possible payoff of each arm is either
1 or 0 (i.e. success or failure), so the expected payoff of
an arm is just the probability of getting a 1.
There are well-known protocols that use Bayesian meth-
ods (e.g., Thompson Sampling (Thompson 1933)) that
approach optimal play in the limit; however, these ap-
proaches are computationally expensive. We show that
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they have to be. No approach that can be implemented
by a PFA can perform optimally. Indeed, for all PFAs,
there exists an  > 0 such that as the number of steps
gets large, the ratio of the expected payoff of the automa-
ton to the expected payoff of the optimal arm is at most
1 − . That is, a PFA must be off by some  > 0 from
optimal play (although we can make  as small as we like
by allowing sufficiently many states). Among families of
finite automata that have near-optimal payoff, we are in-
terested in ones that (a) make efficient use of their states
(so, for a fixed number M of states, have high expected
payoff), (b) converge to near-optimal behavior quickly,
and (c) use simple “human-like” heuristics.
A standard approach to dealing with multi-armed bandit
problem is one we call explore-then-exploit. We simply
test each arm N times (where N is a parameter), and
from then on play the best arm (i.e., the one with the
highest average reward). If the bandit has K arms, then
we need roughlyO(NK log(N) log(K)) states, since we
need to keep track of the possible tuples of outcomes of
the tests, as well as two counters, one to keep track of
which arm is being tested, and the other to keep track of
how many times we have played it.
We can greatly reduce the number of states by essentially
using an elimination tournament. We first compare arm
1 against arm 2, eliminate the worse arm, run the winner
against arm 3, eliminate the worse arm, run the winner
against arm 4, and so on. The way we compare arm
i and j is straightforward: we alternate playing i and
j and use a counter to keep track of the relative num-
ber of successes of i. If the counter hits an appropriate
threshold M (so that i has had M more successes than
j), i is the winner; if the counter hits −M , then j is the
winner. To do this, we need
(
K
2
)
2(2M + 1) ∼ 2K2M
states: we need to keep track of which arms are being
played, which arm is currently moving, and the counter.
In choosing M , we need to balance out the desire not to
mistakenly eliminate a good arm (which is more likely
to happen the smaller that M is) with the desire not to
“waste” too much time in finding the right arm (since
the payoff while we are doing that may not be so high,
particularly if we are playing two arms whose success
probabilities are equal but not very high). We deal with
this by stopping a comparison after an expected number
N of steps. (We implement this by stopping the compar-
ison with probability 1/N , which does not require any
extra states.) As we shall see, this approach, which we
call the elimination tournament, does extremely well.
The -greedy protocol is a slight variant of this approach:
Again, we test for the first N steps, and then play the
current best arm with probability 1 −  and a random
arm with probability . But this requires infinitely many
states, since we must keep track of the fraction of suc-
cesses for all arms to determine the current best arm.
Clearly neither approach is optimal. With positive prob-
ability, both explore-then-exploit and the elimination-
tournament protocols will choose a non-optimal arm;
from then on it is not getting the optimal reward.
The -greedy protocol gets a non-optimal reward with
(roughly) probability . While we can make all these ap-
proaches arbitrarily close to optimal by choosing the pa-
rameters N , , and M appropriately, they do not satisfy
our third criterion: they don’t seem to be what people are
doing. The -greedy approach and explore-then-exploit
require an agent to keep track of large amounts of in-
formation, while the elimination tournament alternates
between arms at every step, which may have nontrivial
costs. (Imagine a gambler in Las Vegas who wants to
compare two arms that are at opposite ends of a large
room. Will he really walk back and forth?)
We instead consider an approach that takes as its starting
point earlier work by Rao (2017), who considered only
two-armed bandits, where, just as for us, each arm has
a payoff in {0, 1}. She defined a family of PFAs that
act like “approximate Bayesians”. More precisely, each
arm has an associated rank that represents a coarse esti-
mate of the arm’s payoff probability. Rao plays the arms
repeatedly (using complicated rules to determine which
arm to play next) in order to estimate the success proba-
bility of each arm, and then chooses the best arm.
While we use ranks, we use them in a very different way
from Rao. We take as our inspiration Simon’s notion of
satisficing (Simon 1956). The idea is that an arm will be
accepted if its success probability is above some thresh-
old. In the words of Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2015):
“Set an aspiration level, search through alternatives se-
quentially, and stop search as soon as an alternative is
found that satisfies the level.” (We remark that the im-
portance of the aspiration level goes back to the 1930s in
the psychology literature, and has been studied at length
since then; see, e.g., the highly-cited work of Lewin et
al. (1944).) But how do we determine the aspiration
level? This is a nontrivial issue. Selten (1998) and Si-
mon (1982) (both Nobel prize winners) discuss this is-
sue at length. As Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2015) ob-
serve, “The aspiration level need not be fixed, but can
be dynamically adjusted to feedback.” In our setting, it
is relatively straightforward: we use an optimism bias
(Sharot 2011). We start with a high aspiration level (suc-
cess probability) p, and run a tournament as above be-
tween each arm k and a “virtual arm” that has success
probability p. Since this is a virtual arm, we are essen-
tially comparing the performance of each arm k to our
expectation. If arm k does not meet our expectation, then
we go to the next arm. If no arm meets our expectation,
we adjust the aspiration level according to this feedback,
by lowering it. This requires KMm states, where M ,
as before, is the counter used to keep track of the relative
performance of the arm being tested andm is the number
of ranks. We call this the aspiration-level approach.
We get good performance by taking m ∼ K, so the
aspiration-level approach uses essentially the same num-
ber of states as the elimination tournament. Moreover,
as we show by simulation, its performance approach de-
grades gracefully as the number of states decreases. Even
with relatively few states, it compares quite favorably to
the -greedy approach and to Thompson Sampling, al-
though they require infinitely many states. More impor-
tantly from our perspective, the aspiration-level approach
is quite human-like. We have already mentioned how it
incorporates satisficing, the adjustment of expectations
according to feedback, and an optimism bias. But there
is more. Whereas the elimination-tournament approach
treats the two arms that it is comparing symmetrically,
the aspiration-level approach does not. If the virtual arm
wins, it just means that we try another arm. Moreover,
especially initially, we expect the virtual arm to win be-
cause we start out with a high aspiration level. On the
other hand, if an actual arm wins, that is the arm we use
from then on. Thus, we want to be relatively quick to
reject an arm, and slow to accept. This can be be viewed
as a negativity bias (Kanouse and Hanson 1972): neg-
ative outcomes have a greater effect than positive out-
comes. The focus on recent behavior can be viewed
as implementing an availability heuristic (Tversky and
Kahneman 1973): people tend to heavily weight their
judgments toward more recent or available information.
Finally, a short run of good luck can have a significant
influence, causing an arm to be played for a long time
(or even played forever, if it is enough to get it accepted).
People are well-known to label some arms as “lucky” and
keep playing them long after the evidence has indicated
otherwise. This can also be viewed as an instance of the
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1998): peo-
ple are much more likely to stick with the current state of
affairs (provided they think it is reasonably good).
2 MULTI-ARMED BANDITS
This section provides the necessary background for the
rest of the paper. In particular, we (1) briefly review
multi-armed bandits, (2) define the notion of optimality
we consider, and (3) prove that a PFA cannot be optimal.
2.1 THE MULTI-ARMED BANDIT PROBLEM
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is a standard
way of modeling the tradeoff between exploitation and
exploration. An agent hasK arms that she can pull. Each
arm offers a set of possible rewards, each obtained with
some probability. The agent does not know the probabil-
ities in advance, but can learn them by playing the arm
sufficiently often. Formally, a K-armed bandit is a tu-
ple distribution over rewards for arm k. Let µk be the
expected reward of arm i, for i = k, . . . ,K. The best
expected reward of B is denoted µ∗B = maxk{µk}.
We assume for simplicity in this paper that the possible
rewards of an arm are either 0 or 1. With this assump-
tion, µk is the probability of getting a 1 with arm k. We
can easily modify the protocol to deal with a finite set of
possible rewards, as long as the set of possible rewards
is known in advance. We also assume for now that the
distributions Rk do not vary over time.
2.2 OPTIMAL PROTOCOLS FOR MAB
PROBLEMS
We are interested in protocols that play MABs (almost)
optimally. Formally, a protocol is a (possibly random-
ized) function from history to actions. We focus on
one particular simple notion of optimality here, which
informally amounts to approaching the average reward
of the best arm. To make this precise, given a pro-
tocol P , let aP,Bt be a random variable that denotes
the arm played by protocol P at the tth step. Thus,
µaP,Bt
is the expected reward of arm aP,Bt . It is easy to
see that the expected cumulative reward of protocol P
when run for N steps on MAB B is Cum(P,B,N) =∑N
t=1 E[µaP,Bt ]. Since the reward for playing the opti-
mal arm of MAB B for N steps is Nµ∗B , the expected
regret is the difference between the cumulative reward
of P and the optimal reward: Reg(P,B,N) = Nµ∗B −
Cum(P,B,N). Finally, the average N -step regret of P
on B is AReg(P,B,N) = Reg(P,B,N)/N . We say
that P is optimal if limN→∞AReg(P,B,N) = 0 for
all MABs B.
As we observed in the introduction, neither explore-
then-exploit nor the -greedy protocol is optimal in this
sense. There are Bayesian approaches that are optimal.
We briefly discuss one: Thompson Sampling (Thomp-
son 1933). Roughly speaking, at each step, this proto-
col computes the probability of each arm being optimal,
given the observations. It then chooses arm k with a
probability proportional to its current estimate that k is
the optimal arm. It is not hard to show that, with proba-
bility 1, the probability of a non-optimal arm being cho-
sen goes to 0. (By way of contrast, the probability of a
non-optimal arm being chosen at any given step with the
-greedy protocol is a constant: at least (K − 1)/K, if
there are K arms.)
As shown by Kaufman, Kordan, and Munos (2012),
Thompson Sampling is optimal in an even stronger
sense than what we have considered so far. Tak-
ing TS to denote Thompson Sampling, not only
do we have limN→∞Reg(TS,B,N)/N = 0, but
there is a constant c∗B (that depends on the MAB
B, but has been completely characterized) such that
limN→∞Reg(TS,N)/ log(N) = c∗B . Moreover, this
is optimal; as shown by Lai and Robbins (1985), for all
protocols P satisfying a minimal technical condition, we
must have limN→∞G(P,B,N)/ log(N) ≥ c∗B . That
means that Thompson Sampling approaches optimal be-
havior as quickly as possible, and its cumulative regret
grows only logarithmically. We mention this because we
will be comparing the performance of our approach to
that of Thompson Sampling later.
2.3 PROBABILISTIC FINITE AUTOMATA AND
NON-OPTIMALITY
As we said in the introduction, we are interested in
resource-bounded agents playing MABs, and we model
resource-boundedness using PFAs. A PFA is just like a
deterministic finite automaton, except that the transitions
are probabilistic. We also want our automata to produce
an output (an arm to pull, or no arm), rather than accept-
ing a language, so, technically, we are looking at what
have been called probabilistic finite automata with out-
put or probabilistic transducers. (This is also the case for
all the earlier papers that considered PFAs playing games
or making decisions, such as (Halpern, Pass, and Seeman
2012; Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1994; Rubinstein
1986; Wilson 2015).) Formally, a PFA with output is a
tuple (Q, q0,Σ, O, γ, δ), where
• Q is a finite set of states;
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state;
• Σ is the input alphabet (in our case this will consist
of the observations “arm k had reward j” for j ∈
{0, 1});
• O is the output alphabet (in our case this will be
“k”, which is interpreted as playing arm k, for k ∈
{1, . . . ,K});
• γ : Q→ ∆(O) is a probabilistic action function (as
usual, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability distribu-
tions on X);
• δ : Q × Σ → ∆(Q) is a probabilistic transition
function.
Intuitively, the automaton starts in state q0 and plays an
arm according to distribution γ(q0). It then observes the
outcome o of pulling the arm (an element of Σ) and then
transitions to a state q′ (according to δ(q0, o)). It then
plays arm γ(q′), and so on.
It is easy to see that the explore-then-exploit protocol
can be implemented by a finite automaton. On the other
hand, the -greedy protocol and Thompson Sampling
cannot. That is because they keep track of the total num-
ber of times each arm k was played, and the fraction of
those times that a reward of 1 was obtained with k. This
requires infinitely many states.
We claim that no protocol implemented by a PFA can be
optimal. To prove this, we need some definitions.
Definition 2.1. A K-arm MAB B = (µ1, . . . , µK) is
generic if (1) µ∗B < 1, (2) µi 6= µj for i 6= j, and (3) if
K = 2, then min(µ1, µ2) > 0.
Note the if we put the obvious uniform distribution on the
set of K-armed bandits (identifying a K-armed bandit
with a K-vector of real numbers), then the set of generic
MABs has probability 1.
Definition 2.2. B′ = (µ′1, . . . , µ′K) is a permutation of
B = (µ1, . . . , µK) if there is some permutation ρ of the
indices such that µk = µ′ρ(k).
Theorem 2.1. For all PFAs M and all generic MABs
B, there exists some M,B > 0 (that, as the no-
tation suggests, depends on both M and B) and
an MAB B′ that is a permutation of B such that
limN→∞Reg(M,B′, N)/N ≥ M,B .
Before giving the proof, we can explain why we must
consider generic MABs and permutations. To understand
why we consider permutations, suppose that M always
plays arm 1. If it so happens that arm 1 is the best arm for
B, then M gets the optimal reward with input B. But it
will not get the optimal reward for a permutation ofB for
which arm 1 is not the best arm. It is not hard to see that if
µ∗B = 1, then there exists a PFA M that gets the optimal
reward given input B or any of its permutations: M just
plays an arm until it does not get a payoff of 1, then goes
on to the next arm. Sooner or later M will play an arm
that always gets a reward of 1. A similar PFA also gets
the optimal reward ifK = 2 given an inputB = (µ1, µ2)
such that µk = 0 for some arm k: it alternates between
the arms until it finds an arm that gives reward 1, and
sticks with that arm. Finally, if µ1 = · · · = µK , then no
matter what arm M plays, it will get the optimal reward
on B and all of its permutations. The requirement that
all µks are distinct is actually stronger than we need, but
since slight perturbations of the rewards of an arm suffice
to make all rewards distinct, we use it here for simplicity.
Proof. Given a PFA M and a nontrivial MAB B, there
are two possibilities: (1) there is some state q that can be
reached from the start state q0 with positive probability
and an arm k such that, after reaching state q, M plays
arm k from then on, no matter what it observes; (2) there
is no such state q. Note that the first case is what happens
with explore-then-exploit. After the exploration phase,
the same arm is played over and over. The second case
is more like Thompson Sampling or -greedy; there is
always some positive probability that a given arm k will
be played.
For case (1), let o1, . . . , oT be a sequence of observations
that, with positive probability, leads M to a state q after
which it always plays arm k. If the arm that M plays
in state q is not the best arm of B, let δ = µ∗B − µk,
and let δM,B be the probability with which o1, . . . , oT
is observed when running M on input B. Clearly,
limN→∞Reg(M,B,N)/N ≥ δδM,B . And if µk = µ∗,
consider a permutation B′ = (µ′1, . . . , µ
′
K) such that
µ′j = 0 if and only if µj = 0 (i.e., the permutation is
the identity on all arms j such that µj = 0) such that
µ′k 6= µ∗B′ = µ∗B . It is still the case that o1, . . . , oT can
be observed with some positive probability δM,B′ when
running M on input B′. Taking δ′ = µ∗B − µj , we have
limN→∞Reg(M,B,N)/N ≥ δ′δM,B′ .
For case (2), no matter what state q M is in, with some
probability q > 0, M plays a non-optimal arm at q or
moves to another state q′ and plays a non-optimal arm
there. Let ∗M = minq q . Since M has only finitely
many states, ∗ > 0. Given as input an MAB B, let
δB be the difference between the µ∗B and the probabil-
ity that the second-best arm returns 1. (Here we are
using the fact that all arms have different probabilities
of returning 1.) Let XM,B,T be a random variable that
represents the reward received on the T th step that M
is run on input B. Our discussion shows that, for all
T , we must have E(XT + XT+1) ≤ 2µ∗B − ∗MδB ,
since with probability at least ∗M , one of XT or XT+1
is at least δB less than µ∗B . Since Reg(M,B, 2N) =
2Nµ∗B −
∑2N
T=1XM,B,T ≥ 2Nµ∗B −N(2µ∗B − ∗NδB),
it follows that Reg(M,B, 2N)/2N ≥ ∗BδB/2. This
gives us the desired result.
3 AN ALMOST-OPTIMAL FAMILY OF
PFAS FOR MAB PROBLEMS
In this section, we introduce the aspiration-level proto-
col more formally. We start by reviewing Rao’s (2017)
approach to dealing with 2-armed bandits, since our ap-
proach uses some of the same ideas.
3.1 RAO’S APPROACH
With only finitely many states, a PFA cannot keep track
of the exact success rate of each arm in an MAB. Thus,
it needs to keep a finite representation of the success
rate. Rao’s idea was to use a finite set of possible
ranks to encode the agent’s belief about the relative
goodness of each arm. There are m possible ranks,
{1, . . . ,m}, where m is a parameter of the protocol.
Thus, Rao’s PFA has m2 possible states, which have
the form (r1, r2) (since Rao considers only 2-armed ban-
dits), where r1, r2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Rao assumes that the initial state of the PFA has the form
(n, n) for some n ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; the exact choice does
not matter. Thus, initially, the two arms are assumed to
be equally good. Of course, if an agent has some prior
reason to believe that one arm is better than the other,
then the initial state can encode this belief.
The action function γ is defined as follows: If the higher-
ranked arm has the highest possible rank (m) and the
other arm does not, then the higher-ranked arm is played.
Otherwise, similar in spirit to Thompson Sampling, the
next arm to play is chosen according to a probability that
depends on the difference between the ranks of the arms
(|r1 − r2|) and how far the arm’s ranks are from aver-
age (|r1 − m/2| + |r2 − m/2|). The two numbers are
then combined using two further parameters (called α
and Cα by Rao) of the protocol. We refer the reader to
(Rao 2017) for the technical detail and intuition.
Finally, the transition function δ is defined as follows: the
rank of the arm last played goes up with some probabil-
ity (if it is not already m) if a payoff of 1 is observed and
goes down with some probability (if it is not already 1) if
a payoff of 0 is observed. The rank of the arm not played
does not changed. The exact probability of a state change
depends on a quantity that Rao calls the inertia, which is
determined by the ranks of the arms, and two other pa-
rameters of the protocol, called β and Ct by Rao. Intu-
itively, the inertia characterizes the resistance to a change
in rank. The less frequently an arm has been played, the
higher its associated inertia will be, so its rank is updated
with a lower probability. Again, we refer the reader to
(Rao 2017) for details.
3.2 THE ASPIRATION-LEVEL PROTOCOL
We want to define a family of PFAs for K-armed MABs.
We continue to use Rao’s idea of associating with each
arm a rank. The naive extension would thus require
O(mK) states. For large K, this is quite unreasonable.
So we assume that the PFA focuses only one arm at a
time, comparing it to a “virtual” arm whose success prob-
ability can be thought of as the agent’s aspiration level
(Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, and Sears 1944). The first
arm that meets the agent’s aspirations is the arm that is
played from then on. As we mentioned in the introduc-
tion, this can be viewed as satisficing (Simon 1956). Not
only does this approach use significantly fewer states, it
seems more like what people do.
Rao’s protocol has another feature that renders it an im-
plausible model of human behavior. It uses a number
of parameters (m,α,Cα, β, Ct) to trade off exploitation
and exploration; the best choice of parameter settings de-
pends on the application domain. Moreover, these pa-
rameters are combined in a nontrivial way (using, for ex-
ample, exponentiation). It is hard to believe that people
would take the trouble (or have enough experience) to
learn the appropriate parameter settings for a particular
domain, nor are they likely to be willing to do the com-
putations needed to use them.
We thus significantly simplify the action function and
transition function. As we said, we use the idea of a
tournament, but we play the current arm against a “vir-
tual arm”, whose success probability is determined by
the aspiration level, which is rank. If there are m ranks,
then a rank of r ∈ {1, . . . ,m} can be thought of as repre-
senting the interval of probability [(r− 1)/m, r/m]. We
thus take the success probability of a virtual arm with
aspiration level r to be (r − .5)/m, the midpoint of the
interval. If we compare arm i to the virtual arm using a
counter. Suppose that we get a success with arm i (i.e.,
1 is observed). Since we expect the virtual arm to have
a success with probability (r − .5)/m, we increase the
counter by 1 with probability 1−(r−.5)/m (since this is
the probability that the virtual arm had a failure, so that
arm i had one more success than the virtual arm), and
leave the counter unchanged with probability (r− .5)/m
(since, with this probability, both the virtual arm and arm
i had a success). Similarly, if there is a failure with arm
i, we decrease the counter with probability (r − .5)/m
and leave it unchanged with probability 1− (r− .5)/m.
We use two thresholds M1 and M2 to decide when to
end the comparison. If the counter reaches M1, then
we declare the current arm i being considered to have
won the tournament; intuitively, its success probability
is higher than that of the virtual arm. From then on we
play arm i. If the counter reaches M2, then the virtual
arm has won the comparison. We (temporarily) elimi-
nate arm k, and compare the virtual arm to arm k + 1 if
k < K. We discuss what happens if k = K shortly, but
first note that there is no analogue to the parameter N
of the elimination-tournament protocol here. The con-
cern in the elimination-tournament protocol is that we
are comparing two arms i and j that have roughly equal,
but not very good success probabilities. Then the tour-
nament will go on for a long time, but not give a high
reward. With the aspiration-level protocol, if arm k has a
success probability that is essentially the same as that of
the virtual arm, although the comparison may go on for
a long time, the agent is getting a cumulative reward that
essentially matches expectations, so there is no pressure
to stop the comparison.
If k = K, then the virtual arm did better than all arms
with this aspiration level. That means that our expecta-
tions are too high, so we lower the aspiration level from
r to r − 1, and retest all arms.
As discussed in the introduction, we do not assume that
M1 = M2. The implications of an arm i winning the
comparison against the virtual arm are much different
than the implications of the virtual arm winning. In the
former case, we play arm i from then on; in the latter
case, we just continue looking for another (hopefully bet-
ter) arm. Because the implications are so different, it
turns out that we want to take M1 significantly larger
than M2. (Our experiments suggest that M1 = 20 and
M2 = −3 are good choices, along with m = 100; see
Section 4.2.)
One other issue: if the actual best success probability
is low (say, .2) and there are 100 ranks, it will take a
long time before the aspiration level is set appropriately.
During this time, the cumulative regret is increasing. To
speed up the process of finding the “right” aspiration
level, we can do a quick preprocessing phase to find the
right range, and then explore more carefully. Specifi-
cally, if m = 100, in the preprocessing phase, when we
reset the rank, we decrease it by 10 (in general, we de-
crease it by
√
m) rather than decreasing it by 1. We also
use smaller values of M1 and M2 (say, M1 = 5 and
M2 = −1 rather than M1 = 20 and M2 = −3). If
an arm i beats the virtual arm when the aspiration level
r = 60, we go back to the previous setting of aspira-
tion level r = 70, and do a more careful search start-
ing from there, now decreasing the aspiration level by 1,
and using M1 = 20 and M2 = −3. This preprocessing
phase allows us to home in on the appropriate expecta-
tions quickly. Again, besides being more efficient, this
seems to be the type of thing that people do.
With this background, we are ready to de-
fine our family of PFAs. For ease of presen-
tation, we do not use a preprocessing phase.
Formally, we have a family MK,m,M1,M2 =
(QK,m,M1,M2 , qm,ΣK , OK , γK , δK,m,M1,M2) of
PFAs, indexed by 4 parameters: K is the total number
of arms, m is the number of possible ranks for each arm,
and M1 and M2 are the upper and lower thresholds for
the counter. We assume that K is given as part of the
input; we discuss how m, M1, and M2 are chosen in the
next section. Not only do we have fewer parameters than
Rao, as we shall see, they are easier to set (and easier to
explain and understand). In more detail, the components
of the tuple are as follows:
• A state q ∈ QK,m,M1,M2 has the form (r, k, c),
where 1 ≤ r ≤ m, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and −M2 < c ≤
M1. Intuitively, a state (r, k, c) says that the current
aspiration level is r, we are testing arm k, and the
counter that keeps track of the relative success rate
of arm k compared to the virtual arm is at c.
• We take the initial state q0 to be (m, 1, 0): we start
by setting the aspiration level tom (the highest level
possible), testing arm 1, and have the counter at 0.
• ΣK consists of observations of the form (k, h),
where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and h ∈ {0, 1}. We observe
the outcome of playing arm k, which is a reward of
either 0 or 1.
• OK = {1, . . . ,K}: we can play any arm.
• The action function γK at a state (r, k, c) plays arm
k.
• The transition function δK,m,M1,M2 proceeds as fol-
lows. In state (r, k, c), if c = M1, the state does
not change. (We have chosen i as the arm to play
from then on.) If c < M1, given an observation
(h, k), if h = 1 (a success was observed), the new
state is (r, i, c′), where c′ = c + 1 with probability
1− (r− .5)/m, and otherwise c′ = c. If h = 0 and
c > M2 + 1, then the new state is (r, i, c′), where
c′ = c − 1 with probability (r − .5)/m, and other-
wise is unchanged. If c = M2 + 1, then with proba-
bility (r − .5)/m, the new state is (r − 1, 1, 0) (the
aspiration level is lowered and we start over com-
paring the virtual arm to all the arms, starting with
arm 1); otherwise the state is unchanged.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 PERFORMANCE METRICS
We use simulations to test the performance of various
protocols. In the simulations, we consider an MAB B
with K arms, whose true success probabilities are uni-
formly distributed in [0,α], where α is a random num-
ber in [0,1]. If we had just assumed that the success
probabilities were uniformly distributed in [0,1], then the
probability of there being an arm in the [0.9,1] interval is
1 − 0.9K , which is approximately 0.995 for K = 50.
Indeed, the probability of there being an arm in the inter-
val [.99, 1], is about 0.4. Not only does this seem unrea-
sonable in practice, this assumption would make it too
easy to set the right aspiration level in our approach (i.e.,
it would hide some real-world difficulty). The assump-
tion that the success probabilities are bounded by α for
a randomly-chosen α seems more reasonable. While as-
suming that the success probabilities are uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, α] may not be so reasonable, our results
remain essentially unchanged even if the success proba-
bilities are chosen adversarially, and the uniform distri-
bution is much easier to generate.
We focus on two metrics when it comes to measuring the
performance of a protocol: (1) the expected cumulative
regret of a protocol P as a function of the number of steps
played (which roughly depends on how long it takes to
find the best arm) and (2) the expected average regret in
the limit (i.e., limN→∞AReg(P,B,N)), which essen-
tially measures the gap between the success probability
of the arm chosen by protocol P and the success proba-
bility of the optimal arm of B. We take the expectation
over MABsB generated as discussed above. Essentially,
we want a protocol that gets to the best arm quickly and
accurately.
4.2 PARAMETER SETTINGS IN THE
ASPIRATION-LEVEL PROTOCOL
There are three parameter settings for the aspiration-level
protocol: the number of ranks m, and the thresholds M1
and M2 for winning and losing a comparison against the
virtual arm. We examine the effect of different choices
here.
The larger m is, the finer distinctions we will be able
to make between the arms that we are testing. Roughly
speaking, if the virtual arm has rank r and the virtual
arm performed better than all arms when the aspiration
level was r + 1, we would expect that all arms have suc-
cess probability less than (r + .5)/m, and that an arm
with success probability greater than (r−.5)/mwill beat
the virtual arm. However, this arm can have probability
as much as 1/m less than the arm with highest success
probability. By taking m larger, we thus minimize the
expected gap between the success probability of the arm
chosen and the best arm.
We consider an MAB B with K = 50 arms and run sim-
ulations. As expected, the larger m is, the smaller the
gap, but there are diminishing returns. Figure 1 shows
that, with other parameters fixed (M1 = 20,M2 = 3),
there is significant improvement in going from m = 50
to m = 100; but the marginal improvement drops off
quickly. This is no significant difference between m =
100 and larger values such as m = 200 or m = 500.
The corresponding gaps between the success probability
of the arm chosen and the success probability of the op-
timal arm of B, averaged over 100 repetitions, are 0.020,
0.007, 0.0068, 0.0065, respectively. In addition, since
we start optimistically by initializing the aspiration level
at the highest possible rank, when m is larger, it takes
longer to get the right aspiration level and hence the cu-
mulative regret is larger, as shown in Figure 1. Consid-
ering both performance metrics as mentioned above, we
choose m = 100 in the later simulations.
Figure 1: Cumulative regret for different m.
Once we fix m, we now examine the choices of M1 and
M2. The parameters M1 and M2 determine the condi-
tions of winning and losing: if counter gets to M1, then
the current arm beats the “virtual arm” and is therefore
chosen as the best arm; if the counter gets to −M2, then
the current arm loses the tournament with the “virtual
arm” and we move to a new arm. If all K arms lose the
tournament, we decrease the aspiration level by 1 and
restart the tournament. We want it to be easier for the
“virtual arm” to win, since the consequences are lower
in that case (the protocol ends if we declare arm i a
winner, whereas we keep going if the “virtual arm” is
a winner). Therefore, it makes sense to have an asym-
metry and choose M1 greater than M2. We again con-
sider an MAB B with K = 50 arms and m = 100
fixed. As shown in Figure 2, the cumulative regret in-
creases as M1 and M2 get larger. However, the gap be-
tween the success probability of the arm chosen by pro-
tocol P and the success probability of the optimal arm
of B, decreases. The corresponding gaps, averaged over
100 repetitions, are 0.014, 0.007, 0.005, 0.004, respec-
tively. Since the number of states in the aspiration-level
protocol is Km(M1 + M2), there is a tradeoff between
accuracy and the number of states required. Taking into
account state-efficiency, accuracy, and the expected cu-
mulative regret, we choose M1 = 20 and M2 = 3.
Both Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that the performance of
the aspiration-level protocol degrades quite gracefully as
we take smaller values of m, M1, and M2 (which is how
we would have to deal with having fewer states).
Figure 2: Cumulative regret for different M1 and M2.
4.3 PARAMETER SETTINGS FOR THE
ELIMINATION TOURNAMENT
The elimination-tournament protocol has two parame-
ters: M (the point at which an arm is declared a winner in
the two-way comparison) and N (recall that 1/N is the
probability that an arm is declared in the two-way com-
parison if no arm is dominant and has M more successes
than the other). Thus, after an expected number of at
mostN(K−1) steps, the elimination-tournament proto-
col has reduced to one arm. We clearly wantM andN to
be large enough to give the protocol time to select a rel-
atively good arm. However, we don’t want to stick with
bad arms for too long, since this will lead to larger cumu-
lative regret. Figure 3 shows the cumulative regrets for
different choices ofN andM , for an MAB withK = 50
arms. For the choices of (N,M) considered—(1000,10),
(1000,20), (1000, 100), (100,10), (100,20)—the gaps,
averaged 100 repetitions, are 0.01, 0.007, 0.006, 0.03,
0.03, respectively. Both N = 1000,M = 20 and
N = 1000,M = 100 give similarly good performance
in terms of the expected average regret, but the latter
leads to larger expected cumulative regret. Therefore,
for K = 50, we choose N = 1000 and M = 20.
Figure 3: Cumulative regret for different N and M .
4.4 COMPARING PROTOCOLS
Based on the simulations above, to minimize the number
of states used while maintaining relatively good perfor-
mance, for K = 50, we choose the parameters m =
100,M1 = 20,M2 = 3 for the aspiration-level pro-
tocol and M = 20, N = 1000 for the elimination-
tournament protocol, and compare these two finite-state
protocols to the -greedy protocol and Thompson Sam-
pling, which are infinite-state protocols. With these
choices, the aspiration-level protocol uses 115,000 states,
while the elimination-tournament protocol uses just over
100,000. While this may seem to be a a lot of states,
they can be encoded using 17 bits. Given the number of
neurons in a human brain, this should not be a problem.
We can greatly reduce the cumulative regret for the
aspiration-level protocol by a preprocessing phase, as
suggested earlier. For K = 50 arms and the aspiration-
level protocol withm = 100,M1 = 20,M2 = 3, we first
use a preprocessing phase to get a rough idea of what the
true highest success probability might be. We use the
parameters suggested earlier, decreasing the aspiration
level by 10 after testing all the arms in the preprocessing,
and use thresholds M ′1 = −5 and M ′2 = −1. We use
this two-phase approach for the aspiration-level protocol
in the following simulation.
We consider MABs with K = 50 arms, and see how
the elimination-tournament protocol, the aspiration-level
protocol, -greedy, and Thompson sampling perform.
Not surprisingly, Thompson sampling performs best, and
has logarithmic cumulative regret, whereas the other
three protocols have linear cumulative regret. After
50,000 steps, the expected difference between the suc-
cess probability of the arm chosen and that of the op-
timal arm for these protocols are 0.007, 0.008, 0.025,
0.003, respectively. Interestingly, both the aspiration-
level protocol and the elimination-tournament protocol
eventually outperform -greedy, although the latter re-
quires infinitely many states.
Figure 4: Cumulative regret over time.
5 DISCUSSION
We have introduced two finite-state protocols for playing
MABs, the aspiration-level protocol and the elimination-
tournament protocol. Both perform quite well in prac-
tice, while using relatively few states. In cases where
switching between arms incurs a significant cost, the
aspiration-level protocol is a better choice.
Recall that the main motivation for this study was under-
standing human behavior. The fact that the aspiration-
level protocol exhibits such human-like behavior, includ-
ing adjusting aspiration levels according to feedback, an
optimism bias, a negativity bias, and a status quo bias,
as well as a focus on recent behavior, suggests that hu-
mans are not being so irrational. Note that these biases
are emphasized if the number of states is decreased. For
example, if an agent decreases M2, the threshold for re-
jecting an arm in a two-way comparison with the virtual
arm, in response to having fewer states, this increases the
negativity bias. Decreasing M1 increases the likelihood
that an agent will continue to play an apparently “lucky
arm”. The impact of decreasing M in the elimination-
tournament protocol is similar. The bottom line is that
these protocols exhibit apparently irrational behavior for
quite rational reasons! At the same time, they may be of
interest even for those not interested in modeling human
behavior, since they have quite good performance, even
with relatively few states.
We have focused here on a static setting, where the prob-
abilities do not change over time. We could easily mod-
ify our PFA to deal with the dynamic setting by simply
resetting the tournaments from time to time. More in-
terestingly, we would like to apply these ideas to a more
game-theoretic setting, such as the wildlife poaching set-
ting considered by Kar et al. (2015), where rangers are
trying to protect rhinos from poachers. We hope to re-
port on that in future work.
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